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(81) 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO POSSESS 
FIREARMS: A DIFFERENT TAKE 
 
DAVID W. WISE* 
he Second Amendment has nothing to do with an individual right to 
possess firearms.  Even the impressive success by individual right 
revisionists over the past four decades to persuade even strong supporters of 
gun regulation to genuflect before nonexistent “Second Amendment rights” 
does not change the fact that the Second Amendment was not intended to, and 
therefore does not, support an individual right to possess guns.  Like the popular 
misconception about another common truism that “possession is nine tenths of 
the law,” repeating an untruth often enough to make it seem true still does not 
make it so.  Nor does a narrow 5–4 Supreme Court ruling in District of 
Columbia v. Heller,1 which overturned years of precedent in a court decision 
that even respected jurists such as, U.S. Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III (a 
Reagan appointee), condemned as having “impos[ed] judicial value judgments 
based on thin and shaky grounds.”2  Stanford’s Jack Rakove, perhaps the 
nation’s leading constitutional historian, declared the Heller decision to be 
“materially defective.”3 
The Second Amendment is only one sentence.  It includes just these 
twenty-seven words: “A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security 
of a free State the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 
infringed.”4  (Commas excluded here).  The controversy surrounds the meaning 
of just three of those words: “Militia” and “the people.”  It is sometimes argued 
that “Militia” and “the people” were intended to mean the same thing, which 
would undermine the most extreme gun rights position.  It would be impossible 
to cite this reading of the Second Amendment as barring all gun regulations, 
when that reading would not merely call for “the people” to be regulated, but 
“well regulated.”  It is clear from the drafting history that neither James 
Madison, the principal author, nor the First Congress, which passed the Second 
Amendment, intended that this amendment apply to the populace at large, for 
they dropped the clause “body of the people” in the final version, and such a 
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1.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
2.  J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS 
ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 68 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 
2012) (alteration in original); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the 
Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 262 (2009). 
3.  See Jack N. Rakove, Thoughts on Heller from a “Real Historian”, BALKINIZATION 
(June 27, 2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thoughts-on-heller-from-real-
historian.html. 
4.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
T 
1
Wise: The Constitution and the Individual Right to Possess Firearms: A
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
82 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 59: p. 81 
“body” would, in any event, define a collective and not an individual right.5  No 
right is absolute in any event. 
The drafting history of the Second Amendment is clear.  Every single 
version of the proposed amendment, from its inception through to the final 
version passed by both houses of the First Congress, dealt with arms in the 
military context.  Some prior versions of the amendment even contained 
language about the rights of conscientious objectors.6  The context in which the 
amendment was debated in the state ratifying conventions was quite clearly in 
the context of whether the national government could disarm the state militias 
and leave military power solely in the hands of a standing army controlled by 
the national government.  In a search of a congressional database of documents 
from the founding period, Professor Michael Dorf found that “nearly all” 
references to the phrase “bear arms” were in a military context.7  Citing an 
unpublished table of his own research, Saul Cornell discovered that ninety-six 
percent of the public references to this phrase in publications during the 
founding period were about a collective right.8  Americans might find such 
issues quaint today, but it was a fiercely debated issue at the time supported by 
contemporary political and philosophical treatises that were overwrought with 
fear of standing armies. 
The Second Amendment does not exist in a vacuum.  It is an amendment to 
the Constitution and must be read in reference to the entire body of the 
Constitution.  The Constitution, as Madison stated, is a compact,9 a social 
contract among the states, and as with any contract, when a phrase has been 
defined in the contract, that definition is determinative and must be used in 
interpretation.  Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution defines “Militia” as a 
military body with officers appointed by the states subject to call into service of 
the United States.10 
The recent finding of an individual right has been criticized, even by some 
conservatives, as an example of “law office history,” which means the type of 
selective argument constructed by an advocate to support a desired 
 
5.  See Brief for Petitioner at 28, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
(No. 07-290), 2008 WL 102223; see also Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The 
Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 126 (2000).  
6.  See generally Don Higginbotham, The Second Amendment in Historical Context, 16 
CONST. COMMENT. 263 (1999); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as 
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 195–99 (2008); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 255–
57 (2008).  For various iterations of the Second Amendment through the drafting history by 
the First Congress, see CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 4, 12, 30, 38–39 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).  
7.  See Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 291, 314 (2000).   
8.  See generally Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of the Original Understanding: A 
Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 164 n.70 (2007) [hereinafter The Original 
Meaning] (referring to his unpublished table).   
9.  See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 159 (1996). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
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conclusion.11  On the first step to the Heller decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia determined that the placement of commas in the 
Second Amendment rendered the first thirteen words of the one sentence 
amendment (forty-eight percent of the amendment) as not really having any 
meaning.12  This truly Orwellian logic faces a number of problems.  The three 
comma version of the amendment in the National Archives is different than the 
one comma version that was certified by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson as 
the one ratified by the states.  Some states ratified a two comma version.  There 
was also a four comma version.13  In point of fact, commas in the 18th century 
were used profusely and often without clear grammatical logic, a practice that 
was exacerbated by the fact that different transcribers making hand-written 
copies had different styles.  As one linguistic commentator has put it: “In the 
18th Century, punctuation marks were as common as medicinal leeches and just 
about as scientific.”14  In addition, at the time of founding, a principle of 
construction was that grammatical symbols did not constitute a part of the 
document to be interpreted.15 
In the 2008 Heller ruling, Justice Scalia compounds this flawed logic by 
stating that these thirteen words were merely a preamble that could not be used 
in interpretation of the sentence of which it is a part.16  It is to state the obvious 
that the fragment, “[a] well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a 
free state” does not make any sense without reference to the rest of the sentence.  
There are other problems with Justice Scalia’s thinking.  First, Chief Justice 
John Marshall, in the very opinion that declared the right of judicial review 
stated, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended 
to be without effect . . . .”17  Second, Justice Scalia quoted the preeminent 18th 
century jurist, William Blackstone, in his decision, but ignores Blackstone’s 
own stricture that “the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the 
construction of an act of parliament.”18  In fact, here the preamble serves the 
purpose of limiting “the people” in this particular amendment to a defined 
group.  Grammatical scholars have pointed out that the awkward construction of 
the amendment to modern eyes is an example of the Latinate absolute 
 
11.  See Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the 
New Boss, Same as the Old Boss”, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2009). 
12.  See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
13.  See Commas and the Second Amendment, GUNCITE, http:// 
www.guncite.com/second_amendment_commas.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2013). 
14.  Adam Freedman, Clause and Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/opinion/16freedman.html?_r=0.  See also Dennis Baron, 
Second Amendment Grammar—The Framers Parsed It One Way, but Will the Supreme Court 
Agree with Their Analysis?, THE WEB OF LANGUAGE BLOG (Mar. 16, 2008, 8:30 PM), 
http://Illinois.edu/blog/view/25/3721?count=1. 
15.  See Hammock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77 (1881) (citing references 
from late 18th century).  See generally YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.  
16.  See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
17.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). 
18.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 60 
(facsimile ed. 1979) (1765–69). 
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commonly used by educated people in the 18th century who learned Latin as 
part of their core curriculum, so that the implied concept of “because” at the 
very beginning of the amendment is understood.19  Does one person out of a 
thousand think that the five Catholic conservatives in the Heller majority would 
set aside the opening words of an amendment: “A well regulated pregnancy, 
being necessary to the creation of families as the foundation of a free state, the 
right of a women to make decisions about her medical treatment, shall not be 
infringed,” in a case involving abortion?  Who would want to appear before a 
court on a DUI charge and cite a statute that said: “The concept of a well 
regulated designated driver, being necessary to the security of freeways, the 
right of the people to return home intoxicated in automobiles, shall not be 
infringed” in their defense? 
In Heller, Justice Scalia unveiled a doctrine of “New Originalism,” which 
seeks to arrive at the original meaning of a law by pointedly and 
incomprehensibly ignoring the original intent of the authors who wrote the law, 
or of the ratifiers who made it a law, and trying instead to determine what the 
general public thought a bill meant (and often by citing authorities from decades 
after the founding moment).  The highly respected conservative jurist Richard 
Posner has branded this as “faux originalism.”20  Popular meaning cannot 
trump original intent.  Popular meaning is all but impossible to determine and 
therefore creates an open door through which a judge could “find” any desired 
result. 
Constitutional historians have noted that Justice Scalia’s approach is itself 
inconsistent with all of the leading theories of legal construction extant at the 
time of the origination of the Second Amendment.21  It certainly violates 
Blackstone, who wrote that “[t]he fairest and most rational method to interpret 
the will of a legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law 
was made . . . .”22  Or elsewhere, when he said that interpretation depended on 
understanding “the evil to be remedied” by the legislator.23  Here, the evil to be 
remedied is quite clearly disarmament of the state militias, as the legislative 
history and the ratifying conventions make manifestly clear.  Professor Saul 
 
 
19. See The Second Amendment: Our Latinate Constitution, LINGUISTICS RES. CENTER 
(Dec. 26, 2012), http://blogs.utexas.edu/lrc/2012/12/26/the-second-amendment-our-latinate-
constitution/; see also Freedman, supra note 14 (“To take an example from Horace likely to 
have been familiar to them: ‘Caesar, being in command of the earth, I fear neither civil war 
nor death by violence’ (ego nec tumultum nec mori per vim metuam, tenente Caesare terras).  
The main clause flows logically from the absolute clause: ‘Because Caesar commands the 
earth, I fear neither civil war nor death by violence.’”).  Therefore, the Second Amendment 
would have been understood by its drafters and ratifiers as meaning: because a well regulated 
militia is necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed.  See id. 
20.  Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/defense-
looseness. 
21.  See Cornell, supra note 11, at 1101–06.  See generally The Original Meaning, 
supra note 8.  
22.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 59. 
23.  The Original Meaning, supra note 8, at 153. 
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss6/6
2013] A DIFFERENT TAKE 85 
Cornell, the former Director of the Second Amendment Research Center at 
Ohio State University, has gone so far as to state that the individual right 
revisionism takes place in a “Bizarro World,” where reality is the opposite of 
the claimed facts.24  And it is true that these arguments are often based on 
quoting members of the Antifederalist minority to interpret the will of the 
Federalist majority who actually prevailed at the ratifying conventions and who 
were elected to the First Congress that drafted the Bill of Rights—an approach 
that would make as much sense as looking to the Tea Party and Fox News to 
determine the will of the majority that passed the Affordable Care Act.  This 
minority did play an important role, and their arguments helped bring about the 
Bill of Rights.  They influenced, but did not prevail, in what democratic 
majorities actually drafted, passed, and ratified.  It is very interesting that even 
the late professor and judge, Robert Bork, who stands at the head of the 
pantheon of the conservative school of originalism, believed that the Second 
Amendment applied only to state militias and not individual citizens.25 
In Heller, the court reversed a unanimous Supreme Court decision, U.S. v. 
Miller,26 which had stood for almost seventy years.  It did so without any new 
historical or legislative facts that were not known to the court in 1939, and in 
the face of increased lethality and gun violence in the intervening years (and 
fostering public safety is one of the accepted purposes of government).  U.S. v. 
Miller was related to the National Firearms Act, a sweeping gun control act 
passed by Congress in 1934.  So recent is the individual rights interpretation of 
the Second Amendment that in passing the bill, the Second Amendment was 
never mentioned in the debates in either house.27  Yet, the Supreme Court 
reversed this unanimous decision and scores of lower court rulings by a mere 5–
4 vote, which sets a dangerous precedent of the Court disregarding its own 
integrity as an institution and becoming an unelected third legislative house—
and the United States will not admit of a House of Lords.  Here, the Scalia 
decision most closely falls into the Bizarro World by turning the Miller decision 
on its head and converting the Second Amendment from a collective right in 
support of state militias into an individual right in which “dangerous and 
unusual weapons”28 that probably have the most to do with modern military 
context would be those most subject to regulation.   
The Second Amendment has two components.  The first is that the national 
 
24.  See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeNino, A Well-Regulated Right: The Early American 
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 504 (2004). 
25.  See Claudia Luther, Bork Says State Gun Laws Constitutional, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
15, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-15/local/me-587_1_state-gun-laws-
constitutional; see also Miriam Bensimhorn, Advocates: Point and Counterpoint, Lawrence 
Tribe and Robert Bork Debate the Framers’ Spacious Terms, LIFE, Fall 1991 (Special Issue), 
at 96, 98 (“[T]he National Rifle Association is always arguing that the Second Amendment 
determines the right to bear arms.  But I think it really is people’s right to bear arms in a 
militia.  The NRA thinks that it protects their right to have Teflon-coated bullets.  But that’s 
not the original understanding.” (quoting Robert Bork)).   
26.  307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
27.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637–80 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
28.  Id. at 571.  
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government cannot disarm state militias.  As such, there is nothing to 
incorporate.29  The second component supported a system prevailing at the time 
of founding, namely that members of the militia (a subset of the population) 
could possess arms for use when they were serving in the militia.  The first of 
these will prevail as long as the United States exists.  The second has been 
rendered archaic and obsolete for perhaps a hundred years, since soldiers were 
no longer required, and in fact were precluded, from bringing their own 
weapons to muster. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, there is an individual right for Americans 
to own and possess guns.  That right is acknowledged under the Ninth 
Amendment, which states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”30  The incomplete historiography in the Scalia opinion fits better under 
this avenue of approach.  At Lexington and Concord, the British tried to disarm 
the militia, not the individual.  The subject of debate at the time of adoption of 
the Second Amendment was the disarmament of the state militias by the new 
central government that had replaced the British.  The issue of disarming 
individual Americans was not on their minds and not of the moment.  At the 
time of the passage of the Second Amendment, Americans possessed such 
rights to own and use weapons as they had under English law, and as handed 
down under common law of the United States.  However strong that right may 
be, it is not the subject here.  It is important to note that the right was not 
created by the Ninth Amendment, but acknowledged by it. 
Similarly, the right to regulate firearms possessed by individuals was and is 
subject to the police powers of the state and local governments as it was passed 
down to the United States from English common law, as a “reserved” right of 
the states acknowledged under the Tenth Amendment as well as under 
regulation of interstate commerce.  Regulation of firearms has been practiced 
from the founding era up to the present day.31  It is an undisputed aspect of 
police power and the legitimate purpose of government to “insure domestic 
tranquility” and to “promote the general welfare” and to ensure public safety.  
Even in the “wild west” that has assumed the status of national myth, it was not 
uncommon to come under gun regulations upon entering a town.32  On gun 
rights, as in several other highly contentious areas, the national solution is to be 
found in the federal nature of our complex Constitutional system of shared 
sovereignty. 
 
29.  See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (decided in 
error in view of author of this essay). 
30.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX.  Note the odd use of commas in this clause.  See id. 
31.  See Cornell & DeNino, supra note 24, at 504; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 681–724 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
32.  In fact, the infamous gunfight at O.K. Corral was instigated by the marshall 
attempting to enforce the law to check firearms.  See Bob Drogin, Gun Laws Were Tougher in 
Old Tombstone, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/23/nation/la-
na-tombstone-20110123; Adam Winkler, Did the Wild West Have More Gun Control than We 
Do Today?, HUFF. POST (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/did-
the-wild-west-have-mo_b_956035.html. 
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